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We have improved the hardware and software of our autocompensating system for 
quantum key distribution by replacing bulk optical components at the end stations with 
fiber-optic equivalents and implementing software that synchronizes end-station 
activities, communicates basis choices, corrects errors and performs privacy 
amplification over a local area network. The all fiber-optic arrangement provides stable, 
efficient and high-contrast routing of the photons.  The low bit error rate leads to high 
error correction efficiency and minimizes data sacrifice during privacy amplification. 
Characterization measurements made on a number of commercial avalanche photodiodes 
are presented that highlight the need for improved devices tailored specifically for 
quantum information applications.  A scheme for frequency shifting the photons 
returning from Alices station to allow them to be distinguished from backscattered noise 
photons is also described. 
OCIS codes: 030.5260, 060.0060, 060.2360, 230.2240, 270.5570. 
 
1. Introduction 
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD)1 enables two users, traditionally known as 
Alice and Bob, to create shared, secret cryptographic keys by transmitting single photons in varying 
quantum states between their stations over an insecure public channel, for example free-space2, 3, 4 or an 
optical fiber.5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13   Autocompensating QKD systems8-13 have the feature that they passively 
and automatically compensate for slow changes in the optical properties of a fiber link, making them 
convenient and practical.  These systems make use of the fact, first noted by Martinelli,14 that light 
propagated through an optical fiber and reflected back using a Faraday mirror, returns orthogonally 
polarized with an accumulated round-trip phase that is independent of the initial polarization state.  Gisin 
and co-workers at the University of Geneva8-10 first described a system based on this principle and 
demonstrated it using a 3-Faraday mirror system.  A 2x2 fiber coupler and two Faraday mirrors were used 
to split arbitrarily polarized pulses of light into twin replicas that Bob sent to Alice.  She in turn reflected 
them with a third Faraday mirror, attenuated them to the single-photon level, and imparted a differential 
phase between the pulses to carry quantum information back to Bob.  Bob then read out the phase 
information interferometrically by recombining the pulses in the original 2x2 coupler and observing from 
which branch of the coupler the photon emerged.   
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Intrigued by Martinellis Faraday orthoconjugation work, we pursued an alternative 
autocompensating quantum cryptography system that used a polarizing beamsplitter to split a pulse into 
equal orthogonally polarized components.11  One component was delayed and then both were sent to 
Alice.  She attenuated and differentially phase-shifted the two components by an amount ∆φA using a fast 
phase modulator, and Faraday-reflected them back to Bob.  They returned, still orthogonally polarized, 
but rotated 90°.  Bob could then alter the differential phase shift between the orthogonal components 
using his own fast phase modulator to shift the first component by ∆φB before it recombined with the 
second on the original polarizing beamsplitter.  The net differential phase ∆φ = (∆φA - ∆φB) controlled the 
polarization state of the recombined beam, allowing the quantum information to be read out using 
polarization analyzing bulk optics.   
Ribordy et al.12 reported an elegant upgrade of the Geneva groups system, which also used a 
polarizing beamsplitter to send orthogonally polarized, time-separated pulses to Alice.  In their case, 
rather than combining the returning single-photon pulses orthogonally and decoding the resulting 
polarization state, polarization controllers were used to transform the pulses to a common (arbitrary) 
polarization state, so that they could be interferometrically combined using a normal 2x2 fiber coupler to 
give phase-shift sensitive routing of the photons.  An adaptation of this system for 1.55 µm operation has 
also been reported.13  
In this paper we report the performance of an upgraded version of our autocompensating quantum 
cryptography system.  In addition, data characterizing the performance of a variety of avalanche 
photodiodes as single-photon detectors for telecom wavelengths are presented.  Finally we describe initial 
tests of a scheme for avoiding backscattering noise based on the idea of frequency shifting the photons 
returning from Alices end station.  Because of this frequency labeling, narrow-band filters at the 
detectors can be used to discriminate against backscattered photons.  
2. All-fiber System 
Our modified system is shown in Figure 1.  Generally, the custom bulk-optic components used in our 
original implementation11 have been replaced with polarization-maintaining (PM) fiber-optic components.  
At Bobs station, a laser pulse is split into two equal-amplitude parallel-polarized pulses using a 2x2 fiber 
coupler, similar to the Geneva groups later arrangement,12 but here using a variable, polarization-
preserving coupler.  The use of all polarization maintaining components in Bobs delay loop enhances the 
stability of the system and eliminates the need for polarization adjusters in the phase-sensitive parts of the 
optical path.  The one polarization adjuster in the system precedes the variable coupler, and is set to 
maximize transmission through the guided-wave phase modulator in Bobs delay loop (ModB), which was 
fabricated by the annealed proton-exchange (APE) process and hence transmits only one linear 
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polarization.  The phase modulator output is connected to one input of a 2x2 fiber-optic polarizing 
beamsplitter15 (PBS1, used here as a 2x1 coupler). The other variable coupler output fiber is connected to 
the second PM input fiber of PBS1 using a modified FC/PC connector that aligns the fast axis of one fiber 
with the slow axis of the other.  PBS1 thus combines the split pulses so that they leave Bobs station 
orthogonally polarized and separated in time by ~30 ns.  
The main improvement at Alices station is the replacement of the bulk-optic polarizer with a 2x2 
fiber-optic polarizing beamsplitter similar to Bobs (PBS2).  Alices polarizing coupler allows her to 
impart equal phase shifts to both polarization components of an arbitrarily polarized arriving pulse using 
a single-polarization phase modulator (ModA) similar to Bobs.  After PBS2 separates them, the two 
components travel around the PM fiber loop in opposite directions and meet in the modulator with the 
same polarization (since one component enters the loop after Faraday reflection and the other before).  
They are given a common phase shift by the modulator, and then retrace each others paths and 
recombine at PBS2 into a single pulse that heads back towards Bob.  The overall round-trip loss at Alices 
station is ~32 dB, and the subsequent one-way transmission loss from Alices station to Bobs detectors, 
including fixed losses and fiber attenuation, is ~11 dB.  Alice encodes information in the pulse pairs by 
applying a phase shift φA = -π/2, 0, π/2, or π to the second pulse of each pair using her modulator (ModA), 
corresponding to (basis,bit) pairs (1,0), (0,1), (1,1), and (0,0), respectively.  Bob selects his decoding basis 
(0 or 1) by applying a phase φB=0 or -π/2 to the first pulse of the returning pair as it travels through the 
delay loop.  The pulses arrive back at the initial beamsplitter identically polarized and with a total 
differential phase shift (π+∆φ), where ∆φ = (φA-φB) and the additional π phase shift is due to the 90° 
Faraday rotation.  For ∆φ=0 or π photons are deterministically routed to D0 or D1, respectively, while for 
∆φ an odd multiple of π/2 photons arrive randomly at either detector with equal probability.  The variable 
coupler was initially set to precisely balance the amplitudes of the recombining pulses by nulling the 
count rate of D0 with ∆φ=π.  Subsequently the split ratio was quite stable and needed only infrequent 
slight adjustments.   
The detection electronics are the same as described in our previous report (Ref. 11, and further 
details below).  For each channel a Fujitsu FPD5W1KS InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD) at T=118 K 
is reverse-biased to ~30 V DC.  Pulses of 1.5 ns duration and 3.3 V amplitude are superimposed on the 
DC voltage in order to periodically raise the total bias just above the reverse breakdown voltage.  The DC 
bias was adjusted to give detector quantum efficiencies ηB~20 %, so with µ=0.3 photon/pulse at 1 MHz, 
the total detection rate was ~5x103 /s.  Fig. 2 shows the count rates for D0 and D1 versus the time delay 
between the detector bias pulses and the arrival of the optical signal for modulator settings ∆φ = 0 and π.  
The detection window has a FWHM of ~750 ps.  The switching contrast ratios achieved for the two phase 
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settings averaged about ~650:1, corresponding to a BER contribution of only 0.15 %.  This routing 
contrast is nearly 20 times better than that achieved with our previous optical mini-bench, which used 
bulk polarization analyzing optics.  The off-peak count rates are due to dark counts (~40 /s for each 
detector) and backscattered 1.31 µm photons (~15 and 25 Hz for D0 and D1, respectively, for 0.3 
photon/pulse returning pulses).  The total BER for our 10 km link at µ=0.3 is thus ~1.5 %.  
3. Key generation results and security considerations 
The results for key generation with the full BB84 protocol over the 10 km link are summarized in Figures 
3a, which shows the raw, error-corrected, and privacy-amplified bit rates and corresponding BERs for 
varying µ.  Three stages of block-parity comparison error correction (with block row lengths 40/50/60) 
reduced the BER to ~0.2% or less, and then random-subset parity comparisons were used to eliminate the 
sparse remaining errors.  All errors could be eliminated at a cost of 10-15% of the raw bits for the 10 km 
link.  Privacy amplification1,2 was implemented by having Alice and Bob compute the parities of M 
additional randomly chosen sets of N/2 of their N shared, error-corrected bits.  M was chosen to be [N- 
(L+S)], where L is the estimated maximum number of the N bits known by Eve, and we chose S=30 to 
dilute Eves information about the final key (proportional to 2-S) to a negligible level.   
For benchmarking purposes we used the simple estimate for the fraction of the raw bits 
potentially known to Eve given in BB841: (2B+µ+5v), where B is the BER, µ is the average number of 
photons/pulse, and v is a variance for the first two quantities.  This estimate makes the assumption that 
Eve can delay measuring beam-split pulses until the bases are revealed, and approximates the maximum 
probability that Eve will detect a photon for a given pulse, [1-exp(-µ)], as µ.  At the maximum of the rate 
curve in Fig. 3a, about 0.6 privacy amplified bits per raw key bit are obtained, corresponding to a 
maximum rate of privacy amplified key generation of ~1.5 kb/s.     
The leak estimation formula in our software can readily be changed to use any appropriate upper 
bound for information leakage.  The value µ=0.3 photons/pulse used in taking the data in Fig. 3 is close to 
optimum under our conditions if only simple beamsplitter and read-and-replace eavesdropping attacks are 
considered.  This moderately high value of µ is then favorable because it gives a higher raw data rate and 
lower BER, leading to higher error correction efficiency.  The maximum estimated information leak rate 
to Eve is then dominated by the beamsplitting attack.  Recent studies of the security of QKD 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, however, have shown that granting Eve measurement abilities well beyond current technology, 
but consistent with known laws of physics, makes her a much more formidable opponent.  In References 
21 and 22 for example, it is assumed that Eve can measure the photon number of every pulse, forward all 
multiphoton pulses to Bob undisturbed over a lossless channel keeping exactly one photon from each for 
herself, and store and analyze these photons after the bases are revealed.  For the multiphoton pulses, she 
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switches Bobs detector efficiencies to unity.  Finally, she intercepts, reads, and tries to repeat a certain 
fraction of the single-photon pulses.  For these pulses Eve induces a 25% error rate, but any remaining 
single-photon pulses and the error-free multiphoton pulses could dilute this rate to a level that would be 
acceptable to Alice and Bob.  Such a powerful attack puts a very severe restriction on the allowable pulse 
size, since to obtain any secure key data under such conditions the ratio of multiphoton to single photon 
pulses must be sufficiently small that a key based only on single-photon pulses received in excess of the 
multiphoton pulses transmitted can be obtained.  In particular, for Poisson distributed pulses and 
neglecting dark counts and error correction, Lütkenhaus21 shows that under the above assumptions the 
optimum rate of secure key generation is obtained if µ~ηBηT, where ηB is Bobs detection efficiency and 
ηT the link transmission probability.  For this choice of µ the gain G, defined as the number of secure bits 
obtained per transmitted pulse, is G~¼ (ηBηT)2.  For our 10 km link this bound is ~60 bits/sec (at 
µ=0.016).  When dark counts and error correction are taken into consideration the net rate is reduced to 
near zero.   
A recent analysis by Gilbert and Hamrick23 argues that the analysis of Ref. 21 is somewhat overly 
conservative, particularly in its handling of 2-photon pulses.  Rather than granting Eve a bit for each 
transmitted 2-photon pulse, Ref. 23 points out that Eve cannot obtain the exact photon state by analyzing 
2-photon pulses (and thus cannot use a read/repeat attack without inducing errors), so her best attack is to 
split the 2-photon pulses, keeping one of the photons and analyzing it after the bases are announced.  
Crucially, only those pulses for which Bob detects the second photon contribute to Eves knowledge of 
the key, and because the no-cloning theorem prohibits faithful amplification of those photons, Ref. 23 
argues that the number of 2-photon pulses Bob detects is necessarily proportional to his detector quantum 
efficiency, ηB.  Following this analysis, fewer of the 2-photon pulses give Eve useful information, and 
therefore fewer bits must be sacrificed to obtain adequate privacy amplification.  With the prescription of 
Ref. 23 for privacy amplification, the peak secure key generation rate for our 10 km link would be ~200 
bits/sec at µ~0.1. 
We also tried a 20 km SMF28 link, with results summarized in Figure 3b.  For the longer fiber, 
increased attenuation (~3 dB, one way) and slightly increased timing jitter reduced the raw bit rate with 
µ=0.3 /pulse to ~2x103 /s.  Under these conditions, the BER contribution due to dark counts increased to 
~2%, and that due to increased 1.3 µm backscattering rose to ~2.6%, giving a total BER of ~4.6%.  At 
this BER level, error correction (using block row lengths 12/18/27) consumed 35-40% of the bits.  The 
lower raw bit rate and reduced error correction and privacy amplification efficiencies produced a BB84 
privacy amplified key generation rate of ~150 bits/sec.  With the privacy amplification prescription of 
Ref. 23 this rate drops to a few bits/sec, while with that of Refs. 21 and 22 no net bits are obtained.  At 
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longer distances it will clearly be necessary to increase the system efficiency by some combination of 
reducing losses, backscatter and dark counts and improving the detector quantum efficiency. 
4. Single-photon detector characterization 
The need to correct all key errors and implement privacy amplification in quantum cryptography systems 
makes it critically important to have high efficiency, low BER detectors.  A number of authors have 
studied the properties of APDs based on low-bandgap materials such as Ge and InGaAs for single photon 
detection.24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32  In general low temperature operation is required to reduce dark count 
rates to acceptably low levels - typically 77 K for Ge devices and from 100-238 K for InGaAs devices.  In 
hopes of finding detectors superior (or at least comparable!) to the Fujitsu devices described above, we 
characterized InGaAs and Ge APDs from several manufacturers as single-photon detectors for 1.3 and 
1.55 µm light (see Table I). 33 34 35  All APDs were mounted on a temperature regulated copper plate. 
Quantum efficiencies and dark count rates were measured for temperatures ranging from 90 K to above 
200 K.  A schematic of the detector characterization setup is shown in Figure 4 36 37 38 39 40.  As in our 
quantum cryptography system described above, the diodes were DC biased below their reverse 
breakdown voltage, Vbr, and pulse biased above Vbr for 1.5 ns intervals at a rate of 1 MHz.  Capacitive 
transients coupled through the APD were canceled using equal lengths of 50 Ω cable attached via 
subminiature SMA tees to the anode and cathode of the APD.  This arrangement has the advantage of 
reducing the average current through the device, which in turn lowers the amount of trapped charge and 
probability of after-pulsing (see Ref. 10 for further details).  Labview41 routines were developed to control 
the bias voltage, sample temperature, and counting electronics.   
The performance of the APDs is summarized in Fig. 5, which shows the dark counts per bias 
pulse and quantum efficiencies obtained as the DC bias voltage applied to the device was varied.  All of 
the APDs were InGaAs devices with the exception of #6, which was Ge.  The highest performing devices 
were Fujitsu type FPD5W1KSF.  Two of these (#s 7 & 8) are the devices used in the cryptography 
experiments, with the typical operating range indicated by the dashed circle.  We note that nominally 
identical devices of later vintage (#s 2 & 5) exhibit drastically different behavior, showing two orders of 
magnitude higher dark rates for QEs ~15%.  This is perhaps not surprising, since even though all of the 
devices have excellent room temperature characteristics, none was designed for low temperature 
operation and their low temperature characteristics are neither controlled for nor documented by the 
manufacturers.  We also note that even though the NEC Ge device has a relatively high dark rate at low 
bias, that rate remains approximately constant as the bias increases while the QE rises steeply over a few 
tenths of a volt.  Thus for QEs>15%, the Ge device is second only to the best Fujitsu diodes in 
performance.   
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In order to compare different APDs taking into account the trade off between obtaining a high 
detection rate at high bias voltage and a low dark-count rate at lower bias, we devised an ad hoc figure of 
merit, K=(S/D)xQE =103⋅QE2/D (where S/D is the signal-to-dark count ratio with µ=0.1 and a 1 MHz 
pulse rate, and QE is the quantum efficiency in %).42  The variation of K with DC bias voltage at various 
temperatures for one of the best Fujitsu APDs (#9) is shown in Figure 6.  Data for both 1.3 and 1.55 µm 
are shown for T in the range 108190 K.  At 1.3 µm, the exponential fall of dark counts with temperature 
leads to values of K exceeding 24,000 at 118 K (S/D~1200, QE~20%).  Below 118 K the dark counts 
begin to increase again, presumably because of increasing lifetimes for electrons in shallow traps.  The 
values of K for 1.55 µm are lower, particularly below 160 K, since K is proportional to QE2 for fixed dark 
counts, and the 1.55 µm absorptivity falls with temperature reducing the QE of the device.  A maximum 
K value of ~2400 (S/N=270, QE~9%) was attained at 160 K for 1.55 µm light. 
Figure 7 summarizes the temperature dependence of the maximum K values for a number of 
devices.  Despite their similar performance at room temperature, the K factors for the devices are spread 
over 3 orders of magnitude, and here too it is seen that even devices of the same type from the same 
manufacturer vary widely in their characteristics.   
As have other authors on this subject, we conclude that there is no way to select devices for 
single-photon counting based on their room temperature performance. Generally there is a strong need for 
APDs specifically tailored for single-photon detection at telecom wavelengths for applications to quantum 
cryptography.  This need is particularly urgent in view of the fact that as telecom technology advances, 
the requirements of the industry are rapidly changing and products for standard applications may become 
unsuitable for low temperature operation (as seems to be the case with later vintage Fujitsu APDs) or 
worse, may become unavailable altogether (as is the case for the EG&G diodes, the NEC NDL5151P1 Ge 
APD, and the Fujitsu FPD5W1KSF, which has now been integrated with a GaAs preamp and is no longer 
offered as a discrete unit).  On the positive side, the fact that some devices not specifically designed for 
photon counting perform reasonably well (for example, the EPM 239 AA SS 43 according to two recent 
reports31, 32) gives us confidence that with deliberate engineering effort superior devices with both higher 
efficiency and lower noise can be made. 
5. Backscatter suppression by frequency shifting returning photons 
Our autocompensating system runs with a continuous stream of outgoing and returning pulses.  In such a 
round-trip system, Raleigh backscattering of photons from the outbound light eventually becomes 
intolerable as the fiber length increases.  In our system it already limits system performance with a 20 km 
link.  An intriguing possibility for reducing noise due to backscattering is to distinguish the signal bearing 
photons from scattered light by shifting the frequency of the photons returning from Alice.  With high 
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efficiency, narrow band filters, Bob could then block the scattered noise photons and detect the 
information bearing photons with a greatly reduced background.  We have carried out an initial 
investigation of this approach using the setup shown schematically in Figure 8.  The conflicting desires 
for high transmission through a narrowband filter and short pulse lengths to minimize detector on-time 
and dark counts dictates the use of near Fourier-transform limited pulses.  These were generated at Bobs 
station using a narrowband cw-laser/amplitude modulator combination to produce 1 ns pulses with a 
bandwidth of ~1 GHz.  At Alices station the photons were sent through a 1 GHz acousto-optic Bragg 
cell.  In double-passing the cell, photons are up-shifted in frequency by 2 GHz.  Bob uses a custom 
Innovative Fibers44 fiber-optic filter consisting of a Bragg-grating phase-shifted at the center by half the 
grating period.  This design produces a narrow transmission band (FWHM ~1 GHz) within a broader 
reflection band (FWHM ~175 GHz)45, 46, 47 and can thus be used to transmit frequency-shifted pulses and 
block unshifted, scattered light. The on-peak transmission of the filter is >90% while the transmission 2 
GHz off-peak is ~7%. 
Measurements of the routing contrast similar to those depicted in Figure 2 were made over the 20 
km fiber link to assess whether frequency shifting the returning light disrupts the Faraday 
autocompensation.  The contrast was found to be ~99% with the 2 GHz shifter operating, 
indistinguishable from the value obtained using the straight-thru port of the Bragg cell with the shifter off.  
This favorable result reflects the fact that the round-trip differential phase shift ∆φS introduced by 
frequency shifting the returning light by ∆f is expected to be of order (2π∆f·PMD·L1/2), where PMD is the 
polarization mode dispersion coefficient for the fiber and L is the fiber length.  Corning SMF-28 is 
specified to have PMD [ 0.2 ps/km1/2 for a single fiber, leading to an estimate of ∆φS ~13 mrad for a 20 
km length.  Since the fraction of misrouted photons is ~∆φS2, this gives a negligible loss of fringe contrast.  
This estimate also suggests that frequency shifts up to ~20 GHz would degrade the switching contrast by 
less than ~2%, indicating that the autocompensation is relatively robust against frequency shifts for low 
PMD fiber.   
Figure 9 shows the detection rate vs. tunable laser wavelength measured with this setup.  The data 
can be fit as the sum of three Lorentzians:  peak 1 is the desired peak for returning shifted pulses and 
peaks 2 and 3 are unshifted peaks due to leakage of narrowband CW light through the amplitude 
modulator and backscattering of outgoing pulses.  In addition, a broadband background with intensity 
~1/3 of the shifted peak intensity due to backscattering of laser super-fluorescence underlies the spectrum.  
To make this arrangement work for quantum cryptography, this broad background would need to be 
eliminated using a band-pass filter in the laser output line.  The on-off ratio of the amplitude modulator 
(~27 dB) would ideally also be improved, but since the backscattered modulator leakage is narrow and 
unshifted, the filter at the detector mostly eliminates it.  We conclude that by shifting the signal photon 
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frequency by 2 GHz, the backscatter/signal ratio can be improved by roughly an order of magnitude with 
this scheme, but at the cost of requiring a more highly controlled light source, matched filters at the 
source and detector, and somewhat reduced transmission to the detectors.  With larger frequency shifts it 
would be possible to obtain even better discrimination.  
An alternative method for avoiding backscattered light noise has been demonstrated by Ribordy 
et al,12 who used intermittent transmission of pulses and a delay line behind Alices attenuator to allow 
detection of the signal photons during intervals when essentially no background light arrived at the 
detectors.  The drawback to this approach is that the system duty factor is reduced by a factor 
[LD/(LT+LD)], where LT is the link length and LD is the delay line length.  However, since Alice must 
attenuate the pulses before sending them back to Bob anyway, reasonably long delay lines are feasible, so 
the loss of key generation rate due to the reduced duty factor can be kept to a reasonable level.   
6. Conclusions 
Replacement of bulk optic components with fiber optic counterparts in our autocompensating quantum 
cryptography system reduced the bit error rate over a 10-km link from ~5% to ~1.5%. This reduced error 
rate allows error correction and privacy amplification to be carried out with significantly improved 
efficiency, with the result that the generation rate of final key was increased from about ~200 bits/s in our 
earlier system to ~1.5 kbits/s in this all-fiber version, using BB84 privacy amplification. The improved 
performance also enabled us to perform quantum key distribution over a 20-km link at a reduced rate due 
to increased backscattering of outgoing light and higher attenuation.  The use of polarization-preserving 
fiber components in the upgraded system, particularly in the delay loop at Bobs station, combined with 
the autocompensating design, results in a very stable system requiring little adjustment during operation. 
Our work characterizing various APDs as single-photon detectors shows the clear need for the 
development of better quantum detectors tailored specifically to quantum cryptography and other 
quantum information applications.  We particularly note that some of the most suitable devices we found, 
imperfect as they may be, are no longer even available. 
Finally, the scheme we described for reducing the noise due to backscattered photons by 
frequency shifting the returning photons was shown to give an order of magnitude reduction in the 
backscatter noise without degrading the interferometric contrast.  This would be sufficient to allow 
autocompensating systems with continuous pulse trains to be used with 20 km or longer fiber links.  
*D.S. Bethune (bethune@almaden.ibm.com) and W.P. Risk are with the IBM Almaden Research Center, 
650 Harry Road, San Jose, California 95120-6099.  M. Navarro, now with the Department of Physics, 
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131, was at IBM at the time of this research.   
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Avalanche Photodiodes Tested 
 
# Manufacturer Model Serial Material VB(V) Kmax Tmax(K) 
1 Fujitsu33 FPD5W1KSF DY-5 InGaAs NA 472 108 
2 Fujitsu FPD5W1KSF 544 (A) InGaAs 53.8 24520 118 
3 Fujitsu FPD5W1KSF 553 (B) InGaAs 52.8 22000 118 
4 Fujitsu FPD5W1KSF 501 (C) InGaAs 54.7 22000 118 
5 Fujitsu FPD5W1KSF EY-44 InGaAs 47.4 210 108 
6 NEC34 NDL5551P1 287 InGaAs 66.2 1038 130 
7 NEC NDL5551P1 291 InGaAs 64.4 556 130 
8 NEC NDL5151P1 270 Ge 34.3 2192 77 
9 EG&G35 C30644 EJT-07 1661 InGaAs 44 43 240 
 
Table I 
Subset of tested APDs corresponding to data shown in Figure 5.  All devices were used with the 
pulse-bias setup shown in schematic in Figure 4.  Kmax is the global maximum value obtained for 
the product of the signal-to-dark ratio (at 0.1 photon/pulse and 1 MHz pulse rate) and the 
quantum efficiency (in %) for all measured DC biases and temperatures.  Tmax is the 
temperature at which Kmax was attained.    
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Figure 1.  DFB laser emits 50 ps pulses at 1 MHz rate.  PBS1,2  fiber-optic polarizing beamsplitters; 
WDM  wavelength division multiplexers for 1.31 and 1.55 µm; FM  Faraday Mirror; BS  fiber-optic 
beamsplitter; ModA,B  APE LiNbO3 phase modulators; D0,1  Fujitsu FPD5W1KSF  InGaAs avalanche 
photodiodes at 118 K.  The fast-slow coupler is an ordinary FCPC coupler with the two key slots rotated 
90º apart. 
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Figure 2.  Count rates vs. detector bias pulse delay for relative phase shifts ∆φ= 0, π. Contrast ratios are 
29.7 and 26.9 dB, respectively.  The detector dark rates (at 1 MHz bias rate) are ~40 /s. Backscattered 
1.31 µm light also contributes to the off-peak counting rates.  The pulse intensity was increased to 0.9 
photons/pulse for these measurements to increase the count rate for the switched-off channel (normally 
small compared to the dark count rates). 
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Figure 3.  a) Data for 10 km fiber; b) data for 20 km fiber.  Raw (!), error corrected (!) and privacy 
amplified (∆) bit rates, and measured bit error rates (◊), vs. the mean number of photons/pulse, µ, leaving 
Alices station.  The leakage rate to Eve is estimated using the original BB84 formula (see text).  All 
curves are simple fits provided as guides to the eye.   
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Figure 4.  Single-photon counting APD test set-up.  Master clock is a SRS-DG535 36 that triggers an 
Avtech37 AVO-9C laser driver and the HP8131A bias pulse generator38.  Minicircuits39 ZFRSC42 or 
ZFRSC2-2 splitters, ZFL2000 amplifiers, and ZEM2B mixers are used for the APD output electronics, 
feeding a Lecroy40 4608c discriminator.  DL1 and DL2 are matched 6.5 ns delay lines attached by SMA 
tees to the anode and cathode of the APD.  DL1 is unterminated, while DL2 is shorted.     
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Figure 5.  Dark counts/bias pulse vs APD QE for various APDs with 1.31 µm light at their optimum 
temperatures.  The DC bias voltage was varied over ~3 V in 50 mV steps to trace the curves.  APDs  7 
and 8 are the devices used in the quantum cryptography experiments, with typical operating points within 
the dashed circle. 
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Figure 6.  K values for Fujitsu FPD5W1KSF APD (#2 in Table) vs. DC bias voltage for various 
temperatures (see text). 
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Figure 7.  Maximum K values attained vs. T for various detectors.  The NEC NDL5151P1 Ge APD (#8 in 
Table) was only tested at 77 K. 
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Figure 8.  Schematic of setup for frequency shifting photons at Alices station using a 1 GHz acousto-
optic Bragg cell.  In double-passing the cell, the photons are shifted up in frequency by 2 GHz.  The 
narrowband cw laser/amplitude modulator combination produces 1 ns pulses with near-Fourier-transform-
limited bandwidth.  Bob uses an Innovative Fibers44 phase-shifted double Bragg grating fiber-optic filter 
with FWHM of ~1 GHz to transmit the frequency shifted pulses and reject unshifted, scattered light.  The 
filter blocking band is ~ 175 GHz wide.     
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Figure 9.  Detection rate vs. tunable laser wavelength with 2 GHz acousto-optic shifter at Alices station.  
Data is fit with three Lorentzians:  peak 1 is the desired peak for returning shifted pulses, while unshifted 
peaks 2 (dashed curve) & 3 (solid curve) are due to leakage of narrowband CW light through the 
amplitude modulator and backscattering of outgoing pulses, respectively.  In addition, a broadband 
background of ~700 counts/sec due to backscattering of laser superfluorescence underlies the spectrum. 
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